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Abstract:  
This paper addresses an issue of great importance for the future organization of the consumer 
electronics industry: the "battle" of control over component-based digitization. We are now 
witnessing the dismantling of the Japanese Model that has prevailed in consumer electronics 
over the past 30 years. Specialized and large-scale component suppliers have taken the lead in 
most component-based innovations and have obtained increasingly powerful positions in the 
value chain of consumer electronics. This paper provides an in-depth study of the strategic and 
structural ramifications of one such component-based innovation, the current transformation of 
sound amplification from conventional to digital amplifiers. We study the early formation of this 
new technology as especially reflected in the particularly dynamic cluster of innovation in 
Denmark and extend the analysis to the global strategizing around this new technology. A 
framework is developed to explain the reluctance of most of the large consumer electronics 
giants in developing/adopting this new technology. 
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1. Introduction 
For nearly half a century following World War II, the Audio/Visual (AV) core of the 
consumer electronics industry, including providers of home stereo equipment, TVs, CD 
players, car audios, and video recorders, enjoyed high and steady growth. During the first 
25 years, US-based companies dominated innovation and commercial applications, but 
from the late 1960s and onwards, Japanese companies took over and have maintained the 
global leadership role through the last decades of the twentieth century - along with 
Dutch Philips and a few Korean latecomers. However, in recent years growth rates in the 
traditional product segments have become flat and stability has been replaced by 
emerging structural changes that pose distressing challenges to the dominant players. 
Specifically, rapid product price erosion due to fierce price competition from new 
entrants, especially manufacturers operating in China and other low-cost Asian countries, 
shrinking product life cycles and increasing digitization of the technology base driven by 
dedicated component suppliers. In addition, we are witnessing an expansion of the 
domain of the AV industry both in the number of different AV product categories as well 
as in the number of the underlying technologies.     
 
Gerard Kleisterlee, CEO of Philips1 recently called for a fundamentally new business 
model in the consumer electronics industry, envisioning flexible organizations, 
partnership networks and cooperative competition, rapid and continuous innovation and 
new multi-functional and multi-technological cross border product categories. Kleisterlee 
foresees Philips leading the way by moving “away from being a vertically integrated 
manufacturing monolith to focus on sales and marketing, with technology leadership”. 2 
If Philips and other leading Original Equipment Manufacturers (OEMs) in the industry in 
actuality are able to translate such rethorics into strategic redirection, the industry is 
likely to come to resemble forms of industrial organization that have become prevalent in 
many industries. Other electronic industries such as the semiconductor, computer, 
telecom, communication and network industries, have seen the incumbents making the 
transition from being vertically integrated and doing nearly everything in-house, to 
becoming so-called Global Flagship Network organizations3 or system integrators, 
“increasingly coordinating somebody else’s activities”4 (Hobday et al., 2003, p. 1) 
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through extensive outsourcing and networking. Borrus and Zysman have located these 
changes in a new mode of competitive strategy that they term "Wintelism"5 and its 
industrial organization counterpart termed "Cross-national Production Networks". 
According to their analysis "competition is shifting away from final assembly and vertical 
control of markets by final assemblers toward the struggle over setting and evolving de 
facto product standards in the market, with market power lodged anywhere in the value 
chain, including product architectures, components and software" (p...). The notion of 
Cross-national Production Networks "signifies the consequent dis-integration of the 
industry's value chain into constituent functions that can be contracted out to 
independent producers wherever those companies are located in the global economy". 
(p.....). These strategic and organizational reshufflings have been driven by the 
interrelated dynamics of technological change and modularization in a context of 
increasing liberalization of global trade. Even if these dynamics have also in recent years 
been important features of the AV industry, leading companies have so far been reluctant 
to embark on this new path.  
 
During the 1980s much of the literature on consumer electronics was occupied with 
explaining why the American consumer electronics industry - having pioneered such 
basic product innovations as the transistor radio, color TV and video recorder - was being 
systematically out-competed by Japanese followers pursuing strategies of tight vertical 
integration between production, development and incremental product and component 
innovation6. The Japanese model definitely prevailed, yet it came under increasing strain 
as growth rates leveled-out, price-competition intensified and ongoing technological 
change penetrated the different product markets during the 1990s. The academic 
literature on consumer electronics has been remarkably silent on these issues in recent 
years, mostly occupied with the phenomenal prospects of digital convergence as an 
innovation strategy aligning large incumbents in consumer electronics, telecom, 
computer and software industries.7 Yet apart from a few notable exceptions such as 
Sony's PlayStation, the new convergence products have not provided the large AV-
oriented incumbents with the fundamental relief from their traditional core markets 
troubles.  
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This paper addresses the much under-emphasized issue of great importance for the future 
organization of the consumer electronics industry: the "battle" for control over 
component-based digitization of consumer electronics. Clearly, the dominant OEMs have 
realized that despite their large in-house component portfolios, specialized and large-
scale component suppliers have taken the lead in many component-based innovations and 
have obtained increasingly powerful positions in the value chain of AV consumer 
electronics. Over the last years we have seen typical IT/telecom-based components, 
formats and standards e.g. hard disks and network cards, MP3 music format and Wi-Fi 
standards making their entry into AV products such as DVD players and TVs. Texas 
Instruments’ new Digital Light Processing technology or Intel’s Liquid Crystal on Silicon 
(LCOS) technology for TVs and flat screen displays are current examples of dedicated 
component suppliers introducing new components into the traditional AV area. This 
development threatens to undermine the business model upon which the large Japanese 
companies established their world dominance within consumer electronics.  
 
One such component-based innovation relates to the current transformation of sound 
amplification from conventional amplifiers to switched/digital amplifiers. This paper 
provides the first in-depth study of the strategic and structural ramifications of these 
innovative processes. In the pioneering phase of this emerging technology, one of the 
most vibrant clusters of innovation was located in Denmark. During the second part of 
the 1990s, path-breaking scientific research was carried out at the Technical University of 
Denmark. This research paved the way for two business ventures that came to play major 
roles in the early attempts to commercialize switched/digital amplification. We first draw 
the picture of the formation of this cluster of innovation based on interviews with its 
leading agents and extend the analysis to the global context in order to better understand 
the broader strategic and organizational dynamics involved in commercializing and 
controlling this new technology, and in particular the strategic positioning game among 
the small specialized component and technology suppliers, the dedicated assemblers, the 
large-scale component suppliers, and the large AV OEMs.  
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Section 2 provides an analysis of the recent structural and corporate dynamics of the 
global consumer electronics industry. Section 3 identifies the critical technological 
trajectories characterizing AV consumer electronics and especially the particular 
trajectories associated with sound amplification leading up to the current transitions. 
Section 4 gives an outline of the pioneering stage in the formation of the new amplifier 
business, illustrated by the Danish case of transformation from university research to 
early venturing in the second half of the 1990s. In section 5 the maturation of the 
business through interaction and integration between the early start-ups and large 
component providers is examined. Section 6 offers a differentiated explanation of the 
large AV OEMs’ comparatively slow and low-key response to this radical component-
based innovation. Finally, the concluding section 7 raises the question of whether this 
case reflects a more general pattern in the dynamics of consumer electronics that signals 
the undermining of the Japanese Model. The case study is based primarily on interviews 
with some of the leading pioneers in this new amplifier technology (see Appendix). 
 
2. The transformation of the consumer electronics industry  
Intuitively one tends to think of the AV-oriented consumer electronics industry as 
strongly dominated by a small group of large providers of end-user products including 
CD and DVD players, stereos, TVs, VCRs, portable audio and home theater systems, the 
most well known being Sony, Matsushita (with the Panasonic, National, Technics and 
JVC brands), Philips, Samsung, Sanyo and Sharp. However, the important role of 
companies that are less visible to the public should not be forgotten; the small specialized 
suppliers of components and modules, the broad-scoped electronic component providers, 
and the dedicated manufacturers and assemblers of components and systems. Figure 1 
shows this more elaborated picture of the industry. The large and globally renowned 
system integrators, strongly devoted to innovation, manufacturing, marketing and 
distribution of AV products and a large array of other consumer electronics products, also 
possess large in-house component portfolios and associated industrial research, design 
and manufacturing (particularly Philips, Sony and Matsushita). 
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With none of the globally dominating providers of AV products any longer American, 
rather Japanese (Matsushita, Pioneer, Sanyo, Sharp and Sony), South Korean (LG 
Electronics and Samsung) or Dutch (Philips)8, US-based companies now primarily play 
important roles as component suppliers. Some prominent examples are Texas 
Instruments, Motorola, National Semiconductor, Intel and Analog Devices. Large 
Japanese players (especially Hitachi and NEC) and European-based STMicroelectronics 
and Philips are also important large-scale electronic component providers, supplying 
components and other products to many other parts of the electronics sector outside of the 
AV industry. For example, Motorola provides semiconductors as well as terminals for 
broadband and satellite TV Networks and mobile phones. 
 
The lack of large American AV OEMs reflects the historical dismantling of the US-based 
AV companies from the late 1960s and into the 1980s, a consequence of Japanese 
companies’ government supported export and leap-frog strategies. These were based on 
highly integrated R&D and manufacturing strategies with a strong focus on imitation and 
incremental product innovation adapted to flexible manufacturing systems.9 On top of 
that, the Japanese OEMs (and even more so Philips) built strong technology bases 
underlying their increasingly broad-scoped portfolios of components that were, at least 
Component providers
Narrow
Broad
Specialized suppliers
(i.e. in digital amplifiers:
Apogee, ICEpower, 
Powerphysics, Tripath, 
Pulsus, NeoFidelity) 
High-End suppliers
OEM system integrators Manufacturers
Original Design and 
Manufacturing (ODM) 
providers
(i.e. Asustek, Benq, 
Compai, Quanta) 
(i.e. Bang & Olufsen, 
Harman Kardon, Krell, 
Mark Levinson, Kiss 
Technology) 
Large-scale component  
Providers 
(i.e. Motorola,  
Crystal Semiconductor  
STMicroelectronics, 
Texas Instruments) 
Large-scale OEMs 
 
 (i.e. LG Electronics,  
 Philips, Matsushita,  
 Pioneer, Samsung,  
 Sanyo, Sharp, Sony) 
Electronics Manufactu-
ring Services (EMS) 
providers 
   (i.e. Celestica,  
   Flextronics, Jabil,  
   Sanmina-SCI, Solectron) 
Figure 1. Mapping Component Providers, System Integrators and Manufactures 
in Consumers Electronics  
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for many critical components, proprietary to their end-products. The American 
companies were renowned for their superior industrial research and capacity for radical 
systems innovations such as the transistor radio and color TV, yet lost out in the end due 
to weak performance in manufacturing, incremental product innovation, design and a 
failure of U.S. industrial policy.10 The exceptional US-renaissance since the early 1990s 
in creating new avenues in information and computer technologies was founded in new 
modes of organizing corporate R&D11 and related dynamics of vertical disintegration 
through outsourcing, venture-based start-ups and innovative networking.12 This 
demonstrates that successful business models are historically context-specific and that the 
huge challenges of the new decentralized and networked information technologies could 
not have been successfully managed within the vertically integrated and proprietary 
corporate framework - neither the traditional US-based structure nor the more recent 
Japanese version.13   
 
Another category of OEMs typically address high-end product market niches (for 
examples see Figure 1). Firms range from very small OEMs dedicated to products for the 
small niches of high-income groups and/or HIFI enthusiasts and professional sound 
studios, to medium-sized firms (such as Bang & Olufsen) offering a combination of 
exclusive design and high quality AV products. Compared to the large-scale OEMs these 
firms have a narrow product portfolio and have more extensively outsourced component 
design, production and a larger share of product assembling. In recent years start-up 
OEMs have made substantial inroads in the DVD-related products markets both in the 
cheap mass markets (e.g. Apex Digital) and in the mid-segments (e.g. Kiss Technology). 
 
Figure 1 furthermore points to two categories of dedicated electronics manufacturers, the 
US-dominated Electronic Manufacturing Services (EMS) providers, such as Flextronics 
and Samina-SCI, which have experienced tremendous growth rates for more than a 
decade, and the Taiwan-dominated Original Design and Manufacturing (ODM) providers 
which have more recently experienced hyper-growth. While the former are large-scale 
companies nearly exclusively specialized in cost-effective manufacturing and assembling 
of a broad array of electronic components and systems for OEM customers, the latter also 
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possess design capabilities and have established lead-positions in a few areas (e.g. 
notebooks).14  
 
So far, the outsourcing wave underlying the hyper-growth of the EMS and ODM 
providers has been much weaker in consumer electronics than in other electronic sectors. 
Only an estimated 0-3% of Japanese consumer electronics OEMs' production, accounting 
for approximately a quarter of the world's total electronics production, has been 
outsourced to EMS providers.15 A few Japanese OEMs in the AV industry, especially 
Matsushita and Sony, have some experience using EMS companies, but even for these 
firms outsourcing has to date also been in single digits.16 Rather than outsourcing, these 
OEMs have established their own manufacturing facilities, often in China, Malaysia, 
Thailand, Indonesia and Vietnam. Philips, the world's third largest AV-consumer 
electronics company, has also tended to maintain ownership control over most 
manufacturing of its product and component portfolio, though substantial relocation to 
China and other low-wage countries has taken place in recent years. Contrasting the AV 
industry, the semiconductor industry, the telecom industry and the communication and 
network industries are all characterized by much higher levels of outsourcing. 
  
From a historical context, there are good reasons for the reluctance of the large AV 
OEMs to embark on a major change towards vertical disintegration. The Japanese OEMs 
(and Philips) still regard manufacturing as a core competency, maintaining large internal 
component production bases. A combination of path-dependency and the comparatively 
higher profitability in parts of the component markets (e.g. semiconductors and LCD 
displays)17 than in most of the end-user markets, seems to explain the slow move towards 
vertical disintegration. However, if recent announcements from companies such as 
Philips and Sony are to be taken seriously, this is likely to change in the coming years.  
 
While much of the literature on outsourcing in the electronics sector has dealt with 
outsourcing of manufacturing operations, limited attention has been directed at the 
strategic issues of the organization of innovation in new digital components. In the 
following sections we shall address one such case of a radical component innovation for 
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AV products - the digital amplifier. This case illustrates the particular role of small 
specialized component or technology suppliers (see Figure 1) and their strategic 
interfacing with large-scale component providers and OEMs. We shall describe how this 
new amplification technology has evolved and is penetrating the AV industry, hence 
gradually replacing the traditional sound amplification technology. Not only is price-
competition and flat demand driving profits out of the large OEMs, but specialized and 
broad-scaled component suppliers (e.g. Texas Instruments and Intel) are now providing 
critical innovations to the AV business, and seem well positioned to appropriate the 
major shares of the rents from these innovations. We posit that these dynamics reflect the 
end of the “Japanese Model” of vertically integrated control over consumer electronics. 
 
3. Digitization of AV consumer electronics and the case of sound amplification 
Over the last 20 years most sectors of the economy have been experiencing a process of 
digitization involving a comprehensive influx of technologies and components originally 
developed by and for the semiconductor and computer industries.18 In AV consumer 
electronics significant technological transformations include:  
 
• The replacement of traditional analog formats of TV, radio, VCR and cassettes 
with formats that record and restore signal sources in digital form, including CD 
(1983), MiniDisc (1991), DVD (1995), and more recently digital radio and TV, 
and MP3/Internet audio. 
• The replacement of various removable media for storing sound and picture 
(records, tapes, CDs and videos) by “on board” or embedded storage technologies 
like flash memory cards and hard disks - devices traditionally used for computers. 
• The change in the form in which audio content (music) is embodied and accessed, 
from tangible products (tapes and CDs) to 'streamed media' downloaded through 
the MP3 format from the Internet (for instance in Internet radio) – yet another 
import from the computer industry – and the probability of visual content (film) 
presently embodied in videos and DVDs becoming increasingly "streamed" as 
sufficient bandwidth is more broadly implemented (e.g. in on-line video).  
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• The transition of display technology in visual products from Cathode Ray Tubes 
(CRT) to Liquid Crystal Displays (LCD) or plasma-based displays. 
• The incorporation of networking and wireless networking technologies into AV 
products for facilitating interaction and connection to the Internet - largely 
enabled by the influx of technologies from the computer and communication 
industry.  
• The replacement of the hitherto predominant form of audio signaling and power 
processing, the linear mode associated with conventional class A/B transistor-
based amplifiers, by a switched amplification mode (Class D or digital amplifiers) 
and the increasing use of digital signal processing. 
 
The rest of this section gives an account of the technological trajectories of sound 
amplification.  
 
In audio equipment the amplifier amplifies the audio signal, for example from a CD 
player, and sends the amplified signal to the speakers. Historically analog sound 
amplification can be differentiated into two generations: valve-based and transistor-based 
amplification. Originally amplifiers employed vacuum tubes or valves to boost the analog 
signal. This technology dates back to the early twentieth century and Lee de Forest's 
invention in 1906 of the ‘audion’ as the first purely electronic component that could 
amplify a signal19. This invention paved the way for sound amplification in telephones, 
radios, phonographs, motion pictures, and later televisions. Through the licensing and 
maturation of the technology by major corporations such as General Electric, it became a 
practical and reliable commercial device.20 Still, vacuum tubes had the drawbacks of 
being large and clumsy, consuming much power, creating much heat, and incurring high 
maintenance costs by burning out rapidly.  
 
The transistor, invented in 1947 by Shockley and his colleagues at Bell Laboratories, 
replaced valve-based amplification in most audio applications over the subsequent 
decades.21 In the late 1950s and early 1960s manufacturing technologies were developed 
by companies such as Western Electric and Texas Instruments, making scale-intensive 
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and low-cost production of transistors feasible - first materializing commercially in the 
"transistor radio" market.22 Over the years improvements in transistor technology made 
transistor-based amplifiers superior in several ways to tube-based amplifiers. However, 
the energy-efficiency of transistor-based amplifiers remained quite low implying, on the 
one hand, a need for large power supplies and, on the other hand, bulky heat sinks to 
absorb the waste electricity and prevent over-heating. In addition, the inherent and 
unavoidable noise and distortion from transistor-based amplifiers results in limitations in 
the resolution and precision of audio signal processing. The introduction of digital audio 
to CDs removed a weak link in the audio signal chain, but since no digital amplifiers 
existed the CD player still needed a so-called Digital to Analog Converter (DAC) to feed 
the audio signal into an analog amplifier to be heard.  
 
Since the mid-1990s Class D or switched amplification technology has been subject to a 
major breakthrough and has proven to be the way ahead. This mode of amplification, 
while known for more than 40 years, had never before been successfully applied in an 
audio context. The switched amplifier exists in two basic forms, one with an analog input 
and one with a digital input - only the latter case can be termed a purely digital 
amplification process.23 Both forms apply a set of technological principles termed Pulse 
Width Modulation (PWM). In switched amplification with analog audio signals PWM 
transforms these signals into pulses enabling the amplifier to synthesize the desired 
output signal directly onto the speaker terminal. In purely digital amplifiers the Pulse 
Code Modulated (PCM) input signal is transformed into the PWM format, which then 
amplifies it in the digital domain. The PWM amplification stage, a type of switching 
circuit, is not influenced by nonlinearity and transistor noise, enhancing sound quality 
greatly. In the final stage of audio production in the signal path, a simple passive low-
pass filter transforms the PWM signal into an analog power signal that can directly drive 
a speaker. Being far more energy-efficient than analog amplifiers, they do not need any 
heat sinks and can be equipped with smaller power supplies, drastically reducing the size 
of switched as compared to conventional amplifiers. Furthermore, switched amplification 
technology can now be reduced to just one or two chips, creating possibilities for 
dramatically lowered manufacturing costs.  
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Class D amplifiers can be embedded in either discrete modules (based on discrete 
standard components) or in chips-based modules (based on integrated components). The 
former are high cost/performance amplifiers and they have since the late 1990s been 
penetrating parts of the high-end niche markets, while the latter have since 2000 begun to 
penetrate the mid- to low-end mass markets. Especially the latter markets, however, are 
still strongly dominated by conventional technology. Rodman & Renshaw Equity 
Research estimates the size of the analog amplifier market between $2.1 billion to 3.0 
billion as of 2003 and the size of the digital amplifier market between $80 to $100 
million, or 2-3% of the total amplifier market.24 This level is expected to increase to $515 
million, or 15% of the total amplifier market by 2006.  
 
The subsequent two sections tell the story of the emergence of the new business of digital 
amplification from the pioneering phase of university research and business venturing 
into the maturing phase of strategic positioning and alliance formations across different 
categories of players. We shall specifically address the pioneering role of Technical 
University of Denmark and two Danish ventures, each reflecting highly different 
strategies.  
 
4. The pioneering phase: Out of research and into business venturing 
Early attempts to build a switched amplifier in the mid-1970s had disappointing results. 
However, by the early to mid-1990s basic scientific research in audio power conversion 
had matured, thus making both switched, and ultimately purely digital, amplification 
within practical reach. At the very frontier was a research community lead by professor 
Michael A.E. Anderson at the Institute of Electric Power Engineering at Technical 
University of Denmark, where the research culminated in two spin-off ventures: Toccata 
Technology initiated by Lars Risbo, and ICEpower initiated by Karsten Nielsen. 25   
 
In the early 1990s, Michael A. E. Andersen, with both a personal and scientific interest in 
HIFI sound, was investigating the opportunities for audio processing from Class D 
amplifiers. Meanwhile, Lars Risbo completed a PhD (1992-94) on audio converters – the 
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two works offered promising synergies, leading Lars Risbo to turn his interest towards 
the principles of PWM. Karsten Nielsen, who had done his masters project on digital 
signal processing algorithms, began a PhD-project in 1995 addressing the opportunities 
for increasing energy-efficiency in amplification. The project was carried out in close 
collaboration with Bang & Olufsen. Both Lars Risbo and Karsten Nielsen’s research 
resulted in a number of patents that provided a sound intellectual property (IP) base for 
their respective ventures.  
 
Lars Risbo’s venture, Toccata Technology (henceforth Toccata), was established in 1997 
and supported by a development contract with the Danish Audio Nord Corporation, a 
company with a strong market position in HIFI products in Scandinavia. Already in 1998, 
Audio Nord launched the world's first fully digital amplifier under the brand Tact 
Millennium. This high-end-market product created huge international attention in HIFI 
circles and eventually sold 500 of $10,000 units – a great commercial success for a small 
HIFI company.  
 
Upon defending his PhD in 1998, Karsten Nielsen was immediately hired by Bang & 
Olufsen and charged with integrating the new amplification technology into Bang & 
Olufsen's speaker systems. The subsequent year Bang & Olufsen successfully launched 
the first speaker, Beolab 1, integrating a switched amplifier. Moreover, to expand and 
mature the broader opportunities of switched amplification technology, Karsten Nielsen’s 
team was spun out as a separate firm, Bang & Olufsen ICEpower (henceforth ICEpower) 
with ownership shared between Bang & Olufsen (75%) and Karsten Nielsen (25%). 
While Karsten Nielsen brought the patents and innovative know-how on switched 
amplification, Bang & Olufsen provided important complementary assets such as a strong 
global brand, manufacturing facilities and probably the world's largest and most 
sophisticated R&D community in acoustics and speaker technology. This community 
came to constitute a highly important lead-user role in the efforts to develop switched 
amplifier modules from Beolab 1 through to the much more ambitious high-end speaker, 
Beolab 5 (launched in 2003). 
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ICEpower and Toccata were not the only firms to explore the opportunities of Class D 
amplifiers. By 2003 we have identified 24 firms with at least some activity in the area 
(see Figure 2 and Table 1). They can be divided into three groups. First, a number of 
small start-up ventures like the Danish ones, including Apogee (USA), JAM 
Technologies (USA), NeoFidelity (Korea), and Tripath (USA). Secondly, a group of 
large vendors of semiconductors and digital signal processing chips, for example 
National Semiconductor and Texas Instruments. Thirdly, a small group of AV OEMs, 
including Philips, Sony and Sharp. 
 
A little over half of these firms are based in the U.S. and the great majority is associated 
with the semiconductor industry rather than the AV industry. Several of the start-ups  
 
were based on close 
cooperation with 
universities prior to their 
founding (besides the 
two Danish ventures 
Mueta, Powerphysics 
and Pulsus). The very 
first pioneers of digital 
amplifiers were Toccata 
and Tripath launching 
products in 1998. In 1999 ICEpower and Texas Instruments joined in (the latter with an 
early version of a Class D amplifier prior to acquiring Toccata). In the following four 
years numerous semiconductor incumbents as well as start-ups dominated the wave of 
new products.  
 
The large AV systems integrators have been comparatively slow-moving with respect to 
developing and adopting digital amplification. Even if Philips, Sharp and Sony have 
developed their own systems, they have, according to unanimous judgments from our 
interviewees, neither been setting the international agenda at the frontier of the  
Figure 2, Accumulated number of companies 
offering digital amplification technology
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Table 1. Companies with in-house digital amplifier products in 2003. 
Company name Country Products/Services* Introduction of 
first product 
turnover in 2002 
(US$ million) 
Start-up companies     
Apogee (1995)**  USA Chips  2000 5 
Bang and Olufsen ICEpower 
(1999)*** 
Denmark Modules 1999 4 
Champion Microelectronics (1998) Taiwan Modules 2002 N/A 
D2Audio Corporation (2002) USA Modules 2002 N/A 
JAM Technologies, Inc. (1999) USA IP 2003 0.5 
Monolithic Power Systems (1997) USA Chips 2002 N/A 
Mueta (2001) Netherlands  IP - N/A 
NeoFidelity Inc. (2000) Korea Chips 2001 N/A 
Powerphysics (1998) USA Chips/Modules 2000 N/A 
Pulsus (1999) Korea Chips/modules 2000 N/A 
Toccata Technology (1997-
2000)**** 
Denmark IP Early 1998 -  
Tripath (1995) USA Chips End of 1998 16.2 
Semiconductor incumbents     
Analog Devices USA Chip 2003 1.700 
Crystal Semiconductors/Cirrus 
Logic 
USA Chips 2003 411 
Maxim USA Chips 2000 1.153 
Microsemi USA Chips 2000 212 
Motorola Semiconductor USA Chips 2000 26.700 
National Semiconductor USA Chips End of 2002 1.670 
STMicroelectronics** Switzerland Chips 2002 6.318 
Texas Instruments**** USA Chips 1999 8.380 
Zetex  UK Chips 2000 N/A 
AV incumbents      
Philips Electronics Netherlands Chips 1998 36.549 
Sharp Japan Chip End of 1999 17.000 
Sony***** Japan Module 2001 62.280 
* We roughly distinguish between three products/services: chip-based products (termed chips), amplifier 
modules based on discrete components (termed modules) and technological knowledge or intellectual 
property (termed IP). The latter is an element of most of the firms' offerings, but IP is only mentioned 
where tangible products could not be identified on the firm Website. 
** Apogee made speakers since 1987, but chose to discontinue this business in 1995 to exclusively focus 
on its digital amplification technology, DDX. STMicroelectronics and Apogee began collaborating on the 
DDX development in early 2001 under the terms of a technology licensing agreement, later expanded to a 
joint development agreement in March, 2002.  
*** Even if Bang and Olufsen has a majority stake in ICEpower it has here been registered as a start-up 
because it has largely operated as an autonomous module supplier with a strong entrepreneurial leadership 
and an R&D team based in the digital amplifier research community at Technical University of Denmark. 
**** Toccata was in 2000 acquired by Texas Instruments. 
***** Previously in cooperation with Mitsubishi Semiconductor. Now with Texas Instruments 
Source: Website of the individual companies, www.classd.com, www.puredigitalaudio.org.   
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technology nor been aggressively pursuing commercialization of digital amplification 
(for an extended discussion see section 6). 
 
5. The maturing phase: The evolving strategic game 
In 1999, with a small group of specialized technology suppliers having demonstrated the 
potential of digital amplification, the strategic game proliferated in different directions. It 
was clear that the small technology specialists on their own neither would be able to fully 
mature the new technology nor penetrate the larger audio market segments. The questions 
regarding which technical design approach to follow, which AV products to adapt to 
(speakers, DVD receivers etc), which market segments to pursue (high-end versus mid- 
or low-end), whether to focus on discrete amplifiers or chips-based amplifiers, and which 
partners to align with, remained open. This section shall trace the evolving strategies of 
Bang & Olufsen ICEpower and Toccata/Texas Instruments. These strategies illustrate the 
two dominant routes for maturing and commercializing digital amplification technology, 
through integrated or chip-based solutions, or through discrete module solutions. 
 
Despite the successful launching of the high-end TACT amplifier, Toccata required more 
than the small royalties this amplifier generated for its survival. While seeking potential 
partners in the semiconductor world, Toccata was approached by Texas Instruments (TI), 
who indicated a strong commitment to exploring the opportunities in digital 
amplification, and possessed several of the components and knowledge assets necessary 
for transferring switched amplification technology into chip design.26 Furthermore, TI 
was recognized as one of the world's most cost-efficient chips producers.  
 
Initially, a licensing contract was signed, providing TI rights to use Toccata’s 
technological knowledge (1 year exclusivity and to IC manufacturing only) and 
supplying Toccata with down payments. In March 2000, following a mutual recognition 
that the technology transfer from Toccata to TI and the chip design project was proving 
more complex than expected, TI acquired Toccata. TI moved quickly to integrate R&D 
activities in digital amplification in order to ensure a more effective design process. 
Through the acquisition TI reduced the vulnerability and uncertainty of being dependent 
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on critical core capabilities located in an independent firm, and eliminated further 
contracting issues (as well as future royalty outlays). Later in 2000, following this 
successful integration, TI launched its first generation digital amplifier chip. By late 2003 
TI was producing its fourth generation chip in the millions. The main challenges in the 
chips design were on the hardware side which is difficult to model particularly with 
regards to semiconductors, while the software side was well defined. TI’s digital 
amplification chips consist of a modulator and an output stage, made in two separate 
silicon processes. Total integration, though technically possible, is still considered too 
costly. TI is thus focused on developing new processes that will lower production costs 
and facilitate such integration in the future.  
 
TI has in particular focused on penetrating the attractive DVD-receiver segment. The 
DVD segment stands out as perhaps the only AV segment experiencing consistently high 
annual growth rates (around 30-40%), as the DVD receiver aspires to become the core 
unit of the 'home-theatre entertainment system' - and one of the core units for integrating 
amplifier chips. By early 2004, the high-end DVD-receiver market was experiencing 
nearly full penetration of digital amplification, while analog technology remained cost-
competitive in the low-end mass market. For the aggregated AV market the penetration 
rate of digital amplification still remains very low (according to different judgments 
between 1 and 3%).  
 
The second Danish technology supplier, ICEpower, pursued an entirely different strategy 
directed at discrete (rather than chip-based) modules and with an initial focus on 
application in high-end speakers. This strategy was strongly influenced by ICEpower’s 
close ties to Bang & Olufsen, the world’s fourth largest speaker specialist with great 
emphasis on sound quality and aesthetic design. ICEpower was encouraged to develop 
nearly complete switched amplifier modules, not only the core components, for 
integration into Bang & Olufsen's speakers. The small size of these modules relative to 
conventional amplifiers offers Bang & Olufsen much greater freedom when addressing 
aesthetic and functional concerns in speaker design. Thus, ICEpower was exposed to a 
tough and extremely professional lead-user environment27 in Bang & Olufsen. Technical 
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development was strongly focused on improving the quality features of the amplifier 
modules based on discrete standard components (in contrast to integrated components), 
and on obtaining frictionless plug 'n play with speaker systems. While most of the other 
specialized suppliers of digital amplification technology provide amplifier chips or 
aspects of the technology underlying chips design (especially the front-end modulator 
part), ICEpower was among the first suppliers of switched amplifiers to develop a full 
amplifier module. Besides addressing the same high-end AV consumer segments that 
Bang & Olufsen serves, ICEpower has also targeted another high-end audio area, namely 
professional audio (e.g. equipment for concerts and sound recording studios). The 
company has established market relations with speaker producers such as Acoustic 
Reality and Foster Electric as well as with semiconductor companies and large AV 
OEMS (e.g. supplying amplifier modules for Sony’s subwoofers) to whom ICEpower 
either sells standard modules or develops customized amplification solutions. 
 
However, since 2002 ICEpower has also developed a chip-oriented strategic arm through 
a licensing contract with Sanyo - who is one of the absolute leaders in analog amplifier 
hybrid modules for many AV markets and possesses core competencies in cost-efficient 
mass-production, distribution and sales. The contract allows Sanyo to use ICEpower 
technology in its design of amplifier chips for both analog and digital platforms, and 
assures ICEpower a per unit sold royalty rate. The process of transforming the 
technological know-how from ICEpower into Sanyo’s chip design and production 
processes has proven highly resource demanding and complex, with the first mass-
produced chips scheduled for launch in 2004.  
 
ICEpower is currently expanding its scope of focus from the amplifier per se to the entire 
audio power conversion chain. This reflects the belief in huge efficiency gains and the 
potential to create a more simple and integrated “black box” solution for audio 
conversion that OEMS could easily integrate into their products. In this respect, 
ICEpower is attempting to become a more broad-based technology provider.  
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Whether OEMs opt for digital amplifiers based on integrated or discrete components they 
will still need to design (or let others design) the circuitry around the core components of 
the amplifier in order to obtain full amplification functionalities and compatibility with 
the AV systems in which they are integrated. To design a full amplifier module rather 
than just the amplifier components requires capabilities in fields such as signal 
modulation, electro magnetic compatibility (EMC), error correction and electric power 
engineering, and competencies in optimizing and integrating the components associated 
with the new technology. These fairly complex system integration capabilities are very 
different from and complementary to the capabilities underlying the digital amplifier. 
ICEpower was early on pioneering full modules based on discrete components. These 
modules are especially targeted at smaller OEMs in the high-end markets, firms with no 
incentives or capabilities for providing such system integration themselves. What may be 
more surprising in this context is that large AV customers operating in the mid- to low-
end markets are also increasingly expecting their chip-based amplifier suppliers to be 
system providers, not simply chips providers.28 This has significantly raised the level of 
knowledge and system integration capabilities needed for chip-based players to leverage 
their positions in the market. Several of the providers of amplifier chips (e.g. TI, Tripath 
and STMicroelectronics) have responded by moving towards designing and offering 
modules (reference designs), or in other words, by offering their customers systems 
knowledge and IP in order to make them buy their chips. 
 
In conclusion, after the early breakthrough years in the mid to late 1990s, two very 
different product-market strategies have proliferated among specialized suppliers of 
digital amplification technology: chip-based solutions for the mid- to low-end mass 
markets and discrete component-based solutions for the high-end small-volume markets. 
Both categories of suppliers have witnessed increased requirements from their OEM 
customers for integrated module solutions. By implication, OEMs opting for such 
solutions in reality choose to outsource not only the amplifier component but also parts of 
their system integration tasks. For the specialized suppliers this has the added advantage 
that OEMs will experience significantly higher costs should they wish to revert back to 
in-house amplifier development.29 On the other hand, the OEM customers seem to have 
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been able to obtain module solutions from their suppliers that minimize their costs of 
switching between different suppliers. But let us now take a more systematic look at the 
incumbents’ response to the challenges of digital amplification. 
 
6. The incumbents’ response 
In the late 1990s, when the technological breakthrough in digital amplification became 
evident in both university research and business venturing, there were good reasons to 
expect that the large AV incumbents would aggressively try to take control over this new 
technology. Basically the mental model of these incumbents was one of vertical 
integration and control over new critical technologies. The conventional amplifier 
represented a critical module in any AV product,30 hence to give up on the new amplifier 
paradigm would not only imply the loss of control over a critical technology module, but 
also the loss of a potentially large source of revenue and profits. 
 
However, when explaining the generally slow response by AV incumbents to this new 
challenge, we will have to acknowledge the role of forces nullifying or modifying such 
strategic and economic incentives. Below we shall consider the relative significance of 
four lock-in mechanisms for explaining the response patterns among different categories 
of incumbents to the challenges of digital amplification. These mechanisms are 
associated with cognitive gaps, with internal stakeholder dispositions, with corporate 
customer demand, and finally with established systems architectures and consumer 
preferences.  
 
Many innovation studies have found that new entrants are more likely to introduce 
radical or disruptive innovations than incumbents and often explanations revolve around 
difficulties of bridging the cognitive gaps between the old and the new technology.31 
Digital sound amplification builds on a set of technological disciplines in which A/B 
amplifier incumbents in the AV industry have no or little prior knowledge. Despite the 
fact that A/B and Class D amplifiers share some components, such as power supplies, 
filters and semiconductors, the knowledge underlying their respective core components 
and systemic interdependencies differ in fundamental ways. Thus, all incumbents were, at 
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least to some extent, locked into an engineering skill base specialized in the conventional 
amplification technology. So, in spite of some technological heredity32 in peripheral parts 
of the amplifier, this new technology reflects a radical competence-destroying 
discontinuity signifying a substantial cognitive barrier.33   
 
Even if this cognitive gap per se has not proven to be an insurmountable barrier for large 
incumbents, it is likely to have been further reinforced by a second lock-in mechanism 
associated with internal stakeholder interests. Thus, agents representing R&D and 
production engineering related to the 'old paradigm' are inclined to resist a new paradigm 
that threatens to erode their power base. This stakeholder position may be perfectly 
rational at the shorter term if the old technology is still competitive vis-à-vis the new, but 
in their judgments for the longer term such stakeholders will tend to overestimate the 
performance prospects for the old technology and underestimate the prospects for the 
new, due to a combination of vested stakeholder interest and asymmetric information. 
Combined, these lock-in mechanisms can explain why incumbents generally were slow-
movers as compared to the pioneers not suffering from these lock-in mechanisms. 
Furthermore, when these mechanisms operate in large and dominant companies they may 
be reflected in the well-known NIH (Not Invented Here) syndrome and the excessive 
belief  that “our engineers” are superior in any respect. Jim Shanahan, founder and VP of 
Marketing in Jam Technologies,  a small IP digital amplifier entrant, told us that 
according to his experience with the OEMs their attitude is  “if you can do it, we can do it 
better, because we are (fill in company name here.)” 
 
While the first two lock-in mechanisms apply to any corporate context, the third and the 
fourth lock-in mechanism only apply to vertically integrated companies such as Philips, 
Matsushita and Sony with distinctive component and end-product divisions. In such a 
context component divisions tend to be constrained by the captive markets of the product 
divisions who in turn are more or less free to decide whether or not to buy new 
components offered by the component division. The third lock-in mechanism reflects the 
situation where a product division chose not to adopt a new component offered by the 
component division, either because the corporate customer considers the old technology 
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still to be competitive or because it prefers other solutions available in the market place. 
In such a situation the internal corporate customer may block the dynamic learning 
processes with respect to the new technology in the component division. In contrast, 
“pure play” component providers are open to pursue any market potentials they may find, 
for instance in the exclusive high-end niches, and thereby gain invaluable learning 
experience on which to base further improvements of the technology, and eventually 
move down into the high-volume markets.  
 
The fourth lock-in mechanism may sometimes be difficult to distinguish from the third. It 
relates to the inertia mechanisms associated with the “perfect match” between the old 
technology and ingrained system architectures and their underlying organizational 
routines34, a lock-in that is reinforced by major consumer segments being unwilling to 
adopt new and unfamiliar architectures.35 Thus, in for instance home stereo markets large 
consumer segments have for long remained faithful to the familiar architectures that 
include a heavy A/B amplifier box that signals solid quality and is perceived as the 
natural heart of home AV products.  
 
Figure 3 shows the major providers of analog A/B amplifiers and their strategic response 
to the challenges of digital amplification. These are the companies with both the strongest 
incentives to jump unto the new paradigm and the most powerful internal stakeholders in 
favor of the old paradigm. 
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 Dominant firms in A/B  
amplifier technology 
  Texas Instruments 
STMicroelectronics 
 
  Philips 
  Toshiba 
  Sanyo 
 AV OEMs  
Strategic response to  
Digital amplification technology 
   - Licensee agreement and cooperation with Apogee 
   - Production contract with Tripath 
   Acquisition of Toccata/production of chips 
   Slow response – few products 
   Early development of internal technology – few products 
    Slow response - licensing agreement with ICEpower 
   No digital amplification technology 
National Semiconductor 
 Specialized semiconductor companies 
Source: The information is provided by the companies' Web sites supplemented by the judgments 
of our interviewees (see Appendix). 
Figure 3. The responses of the dominant players in conventional A/B amplification 
technology to the challenge of switched amplification technology. 
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Three of the companies are specialized semiconductor companies, and two of these, 
STMicroelectronics and Texas Instruments, have today, through engagements with small 
specialized suppliers of digital amplification technology, established powerful positions 
in the chip-based digital amplification market. STMicroelectronics, especially through a 
technology licensing agreement signed in 2001 with Apogee, and Texas Instruments - as 
previously mentioned - through the acquisition in 2000 of Toccata. National 
Semiconductor has been very slow moving and has only been out with Class D solutions 
at the lower power levels (e.g. for earphones). 
 
The other three companies in Figure 3 are consumer electronics giants with large in-
house component portfolios. Philips quite early on developed its own digital 
amplification technology, but has not so far demonstrated a strong commitment to 
integrate the new technology in its products. Philips has clearly demonstrated its R&D 
capacities in the field and possesses the competencies in both power and front-end 
technologies needed to become an important player in the digital amplifier market, but 
lock-in problems associated both with the alignment between the component provider 
and its corporate customers in the product divisions, and with the conservative bias 
associated with well-established product architectures and their loyal consumers, may 
explain the less successful implementation hitherto.  
 
Sanyo combines a strong position in traditional analog amplifier and chip production with 
a position as large AV OEM. In its amplifier business Sanyo has shown a dedicated 
commitment to ongoing optimization of its conventional module technology and 
manufacturing capabilities. Thus, when the paradigmatic shift in sound amplification 
emerged, Sanyo was ill prepared from both a cognitive and stakeholder perspective. 
However, the previously mentioned licensing agreement from 2002 with ICEpower gives 
Sanyo the opportunity to combine ICEpower's technology with Sanyo’s chip 
manufacturing and miniaturization capabilities and distribution network. The downside 
for Sanyo is that ICEpower (at least so far) controls the new technology and that Sanyo 
will have to pay a royalty for each amplifier chip sold. Sanyo combines a slow response 
with an active catch-up effort based on external technology. The slow response seems to 
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stem from the cost-efficient and well-established product architecture and market 
preferences rather than to the particular captive market constraints.  
 
Toshiba, which is operating in the low-price end of the AV markets, has not yet faced any 
competitive threat from digital amplification technology, and has also not demonstrated 
an active stance in the transition from traditional A/B technology to digital technology. 
Also in this case the lock-in mechanisms associated with both corporate customer 
demand and conservative consumer preferences seem to explain the path-dependency of 
a major incumbent. 
 
Figure 4 shows how large AV OEMs without a particularly strong position in A/B 
amplification have responded to the digital amplifier. On the one hand, these players have 
no strong stakeholder interests embedded in conventional amplification assets. On the 
other hand, their incentives to engage in strong in-house development are likely to be 
lower than those of the players with strong positions in A/B technology. This is also 
reflected in the dominant pattern of Figure 3. Only Sony has successfully developed its 
own proprietary digital amplifier module, the so-called S-master technology, which 
seems more or less dedicated to its captive product markets in order to seek 
differentiation gains. However, the core component of this module, the amplifier chips, 
was from the early start provided by Mitsubishi and more recently by Texas Instruments. 
Sharp has been less successful with its 1-bit technology which has so far been 
implemented in few products and small volumes. The other three companies, Matsushita, 
Samsung and LG Electronics have adopted external solutions from specialized suppliers.  
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Figure 4. The response of AV OEMs without a dominant position in A/B amplification 
technology to the challenge of switched amplification technology 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
It seems clear from the analysis above that the two “universal” lock-in mechanisms 
(cognitive gaps and vested stakeholder dispositions) fail to explain the differential 
response to the new technology from different categories of incumbents. The fact that 
vertically integrated AV incumbents have been slower and less successful in pursuing the 
opportunities from digital amplification than the “pure play” semiconductor incumbents 
(STMicroelectronics and TI) points to the particular importance of the lock-in 
mechanisms pertinent to the vertically integrated AV companies, one associated with 
short-term corporate customer (or product divisional) preferences and the other with 
ingrained organizational routines and consumer preferences for well-established product 
architectures.  
 
Lifting the level of analysis from the particular case at hand to the overall contextual 
dynamics of consumer electronics, yet another factor becomes visible. The vast 
expansion of the AV consumer electronic product domain and technological opportunity 
set in recent years has created a new agenda increasingly forcing the AV giants to 
carefully prioritize which new technologies and components to invest in and which to 
leave to others. In contrast to the situation ten years ago, consumer electronic incumbents 
 
External technology – e.g. Pulsus, Neofidelity 
External technology – e.g. Texas Instruments, Tripath 
External technology – e.g. Texas Instruments, ICEpower 
Internal 1-bit technology –few products 
Internal module – external chips 
Large AV OEMs without a dominant 
position in A/B amplifier technology 
Strategic response to  
switched amplification technology 
  Sony 
Sharp 
 
  Samsung 
 
  Matsushita 
 
  LG Electronics 
Source: The information is provided by the companies' Web sites supplemented by the judgments of our 
interviewees (see Appendix). 
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can no longer afford to develop all technologies internally. In this new competitive 
context AV OEMs seem to have bet their money on high growth products/technologies 
with possibilities for pushing performance and adding extra functions valued by their 
mass market consumers. Products such as flat screen TVs, DVDs, MP3 players, home 
theatre systems and the rapidly emerging group of digital convergence products, not the 
more mature products and components categories. Despite the new technology the 
amplifier is still considered a mature component or module that cannot provide the AV 
OEMs large new growth opportunities nor a clear competitive edge. 
 
7. Conclusion  
In contrast to other parts of the electronics sector (as well as many other industries) the 
AV industry has up till now remained remarkably reluctant to jump onto the wave of 
vertical disintegration involving outsourcing of the systems assembling, R&D and 
manufacturing of components and modules. This reluctance may to a large extent be 
ascribed to path-dependencies of the 'vertical integration' model successfully pursued by 
the Japanese companies such as Sony and Matsushita in the 1970s, 1980s and into the 
1990s.  
 
The path-dependency factor can be translated into some difficult strategic trade-off 
dilemmas. First, the trade-off between the perhaps decreasing advantages of maintaining 
control over manufacturing in order to assure optimal coordination between product and 
process development versus the increasing cost advantages that dedicated manufacturers 
(ODMs and EMS providers) have demonstrated in large-scale production. The 
increasingly tough price-competition in most AV mass markets seems currently to drive 
AV OEMS towards short-term return-on-asset considerations and into more 
comprehensive outsourcing of assembling and manufacturing processes. Secondly, the 
dilemma between the advantages of maintaining technological lead positions based on in-
house R&D associated with a large component portfolio, versus acknowledging that 
specialized suppliers of technology and components in many areas tend to conquer the 
cutting-edge of technological innovation in consumer electronics.  
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However, it is likely more than path dependency that has made the large AV OEMs 
reluctant to disintegrate and outsource. Companies like Philips and Sony have better 
profitability on their semiconductors and other critical components than on most of their 
AV end-products, giving them an incentive to try to maintain strong positions in these 
component markets. However, the problem for the leading AV OEMs is that the AV 
product markets have witnessed cascading penetration of new technologies primarily 
originating in the neighboring information and computer industries. This means that the 
"natural" initiative has tended increasingly to slide from inside to outside the AV OEMs' 
domain, leaving them with the difficult choice of either embarking on the risky task of 
trying to catch up with little hope of being able to leapfrog, or to choose the "low-cost" 
and/or best performing solution and outsource.  This "outside-in" invasion of 
technologies and components has furthermore been associated with a tendency, also 
originating from the information and computer industries, towards using modular systems 
based on standard interfaces giving the AV OEMs decreasing scope for building 
proprietary components and systems that can keep competitors at bay.  
 
The case presented in this paper on the transition from conventional to digital 
amplification clearly illustrates this broader pattern. It points to the critical role that 
pioneering small specialized component or technology suppliers can play in interaction 
with small medium- and high-end AV OEMs (like Bang & Olufsen and Kiss 
Technology) and large-scale component providers (like STMicroelectronics and TI) in 
setting the agenda for the next generation AV amplification technology. We do not try to 
argue that the large AV OEMs are not able to integrate this technology - they clearly are. 
What we do maintain, however, is that increasing shares of the unique technological 
competencies underlying the current transformation of AV product markets are located 
outside the natural domains of most of the AV incumbents and that the Japanese Model 
of the 1970s and 1980s is being replaced by a much more globally integrated network 
model in which in particular European and American firms (specialized suppliers, large-
scale component providers, and EMS providers) and new Chinese/Asian players (ODMs) 
have demonstrated increasingly strong positions. To what extent and for how long the 
Japanese Model can live on within the AV product markets on the basis of a) powerful 
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competencies in system integration and the building of product and technology standards 
b) strong branding and marketing competencies added c) cutting-edge positions in a 
decreasing number of critical component areas, will be left to be seen. One thing, 
however, seems quite sure: the heydays of the classical Japanese Model, based on vertical 
control and powerful integration of product development and flexible production 
systems, are long gone. The current strong strategic focus of the large AV OEMs on 
convergence products may not only reflect new technological opportunities for 
interlinking user functionalities from different industries and product markets (e.g. 
telecom, computer and networking), but also the struggle to find new business 
opportunities outside the hard-pressured traditional core areas of AV consumer 
electronics. But it is a tough struggle dominated by two previously thriving industries, the 
PC and the consumer electronics industry, whose leading players are now desperate to 
make inroads into the other party's backyard.      
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Appendix: List of interviewees 
• Michael A.E. Andersen, Professor, Technical University of Denmark (interviewed 
28/10-2003). 
• Niels Anderskouv, Vice President of Digital Audio & Video, Texas Instruments 
(interviewed 19/12-2003). 
• Lars Michael Fenger, Research and Technology Access Engineer, Bang & 
Olufsen ICEpower (interviewed 9/9-2003). 
• Karsten Nielsen, founder and Chief Technical Officer, Bang & Olufsen ICEpower 
(interviewed 12/11-2003). 
• Steen Klint Pedersen, Global Sales Manager, Bang & Olufsen ICE power 
(interviewed 9/4-2002). 
• Poul Præstgaard, Senior Technology and Innovation Manager, Bang & Olufsen 
(interviewed 21/10-2003). 
• Lars Risbo, founder of Toccata and Strategic Research Manager, Digital Audio & 
Video, Texas Instruments (interviewed 6/10-2003). 
• Jim Shanahan, founder of and VP of Marketing in Jam Technologies 
(correspondence via e-mail, April 2004). 
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